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REFORMING THE LAW OF RAPE IN THE UNITED STATES:
SOME ADVICE FROM THE ANTIPODES
Dr. Andrew Hemming*
This Article sets out a comprehensive model provision for the crime
of rape by defining the specified fault elements, such as knowledge and
recklessly, within the provision. In particular, the definition of recklessly
incorporates a requirement that the person took reasonable steps to
ascertain consent. The model provision also addresses the twin issues of
intoxication and mistake of fact, with the aim of making the fault
elements of the crime of rape more objective.
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................
I.

1

AN AUSTRALIAN BENCHMARK FOR DEFINING
THE OFFENSE OF RAPE................................................................3

A. Australia's Criminal Law Landscape.................................3
B. The Consistency of the Vitiating Factorsfor Consent ....... 5
C. The Consistency of the Fault Elements for Rape ............. 10
1. Fault E lem ents...........................................................11
2. M istake of Fact..........................................................13
3. Intoxication ............................................................... 14
D. ProposedModel Provisionfor Rape ................................ 15
II.

RAPE OFFENSES IN THE UNITED STATES...................................17

United States Model Penal Code......................................17
Impact and JudicialInterpretation of Model
Penal Code ....................................................................... 19
C. Affirmative Consent .......................................................... 31
D. Affirmative Consent and Intoxication...............................34
A.
B.

III.

MODEL. PROVISION FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE
IN THE UNITED STATES.............................................................40

CONCLUSION...........................................................................................45
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to set out a comprehensive model
provision for the crime of rape that can be incorporated into all criminal
jurisdictions in the United States. This is in part achieved by defining the
specified fault elements, such as knowledge and recklessness, within the
* Associate Professor in Law, University of Southern Queensland.
1
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provision. One objective of this Article is to show that it is possible to
reform key criminal offenses in the United States in a uniform manner,
by drawing on the more progressive legislative provisions for rape in
Australia. Apart from addressing the current inconsistencies and
inadequacies in rape provisions in the United States, the proposed model
provision is also designed to clarify the vexed question of whether the
defendant reasonably believed the victim was consenting. In this way, it
is hoped that in the future some of the well-known difficulties in securing
a conviction for rape, where it is often one person's word versus another's
against a standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt, may be reduced
through the comprehensiveness and clarity of the statutory language
employed in the model provision.
This Article recognizes that in seeking to identify a model provision
for rape it may be objected that the more comprehensive the statutory
language employed, the greater the opportunity for diverse interpretations
with a consequent loss of clarity. This criticism is met by the argument
that comprehensiveness and clarity are not mutually exclusive. On the
contrary, by deliberately incorporating defined fault elements, the
treatment of mistake of fact and intoxication into the model provision, the
operation of the provision is clarified. Given such a comprehensive
approach, it will be argued that despite any differences in the framework
and statutory construction between the criminal regimes in Australia and
the United States, such differences are minimized in the treatment of rape
by limiting the meaning of the specified fault elements and the operation
of the "defenses" of mistake of fact and intoxication to the relevant
division of the respective Criminal Code.
For the offense of rape (sexual intercourse without consent) this
Article addresses three questions: (1) whether in the search for
consistency in the vitiating factors for consent, the better approach is to
specifically identify a detailed list of vitiating factors or to prefer more
general provisions that rely on judicial discretion based on the facts of the
case in the tradition of the common law; (2) how to ensure the consistency
of the reach of the fault elements, particularly the scope of the definition
of recklessness or reckless indifference and the threshold for criminal
responsibility; and (3) how to ensure consistency in the operation of the
"defenses" of mistake of fact and intoxication. Given that the crime of
rape has a strong subjective component in terms of whether the
complainant believed lack of consent had been clearly communicated and
understood by the accused, the overall purpose of this Article is twofold:
(1) to make the test for mistaken belief in consent more objective by
requiring the accused to have taken positive steps to ascertain consent;
and (2) to make the process of adjudging guilt for rape more objective by
making the test one of whether an ordinary sober person in similar
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circumstances to the accused would have reasonably concluded that free
and voluntary consent had been given.
I. AN AUSTRALIAN BENCHMARK FOR DEFINING THE OFFENSE OF RAPE

A. Australia'sCriminalLaw Landscape
Australia has a very disparate mosaic of criminal laws with nine
criminal law jurisdictions. Unlike Canada, which has a single Criminal
Code,' Australia's criminal laws are State-based and can broadly be
grouped as either Code States and Territories, 2 or common law States. 3
Superimposed above State legislation is Commonwealth legislation,4 and
the distinction relates to the powers given to the Commonwealth under
Section 51 of the Federal Constitution. 5 In respect to giving the
responsibility for criminal laws to the individual States, Australia is
similar to the United States.
It is necessary to explain the key differences in Criminal Code
architecture in Australia in order for the reader in the United States to
understand how the various rape provisions have been constructed. This
brief summary will commence with the "Griffith Code" States of
Queensland, Western Australia, and Tasmania. In the Griffith Codes,
offenses are defined by reference to conduct and circumstances, which
may occasionally include the existence of a specific state of mind. The
architecture of the Griffith Codes was designed to avoid the specification
of a fault element in an offense. Instead, the absence of a fault element is

1. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46.
2. The Australian Code States and Territories are Queensland (1899), Western Australia
(1902), Tasmania (1924), the Northern Territory (1983), and the Australian Capital Territory
(2002). Queensland, Western Australia, and Tasmania are known as "Griffith Code" States after
Sir Samuel Griffith and share a common Code architecture.
3. The Australian common law States are New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia,
although each of these States have a significant amount of statutory law. See Crimes Act 1900

(NSW); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); CriminalLaw ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA).
4. See, for example, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ch 2. The Northern Territory and

the Australian Capital Territory have adopted Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code Act, which deals
with criminal responsibility and includes definitions of physical elements (ch 2 sub-div 4.1), and
fault elements (ch 2 sub-div 5.1). Consequently, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital
Territory have a very different Code architecture to the "Griffith Code" States of Queensland,
Western Australia, and Tasmania.
5. See, e.g., Australian Constitution s 51 (listing the legislative powers of the Federal
Parliament). So, for example, the Commonwealth's capacity to deal with drug offenses under the
Customs Act, 1901 (Cth), is based on two heads of power under the Constitution: the trade and
commerce power and the external affairs power. Australian Constitution s 51.. Other relevant
heads of power for federal criminal offenses include: taxation; postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and
other like services; quarantine; fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits; currency,
coinage, and legal tender; and copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trademarks. Id.
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stated as a matter of defense or excuse. 6 Consequently, the offense of rape

is defined in Section 349(1) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) in these

terms: "Any person who rapes another person is guilty of a crime." 7
By contrast, the architecture of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), which
is based on the United States Model Penal Code (1962) and has been
followed by the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory,
specifically defines both physical elements and fault elements in Part 2.2
of Chapter 2.8 The formula adopted is that an offense consists of physical
and fault elements. Physical elements can be conduct, a result of conduct,
or a circumstance in which conduct, or a result of conduct, happens. Fault
elements can be intention, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, all of
which are defined. 9 Thus, Section 192 of the CriminalCode 1983 (NT),
which deals with sexual intercourse without consent, is written in terms
that reflect the architecture of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). For present
purposes, dealing with the specification of fault elements, the relevant
sub-sections are Sub-Section 192(3) and Sub-Section 192(4A):
(3) A person is guilty of an offense if the person has sexual
intercourse with another person:
(a) without the other person's consent; and
(b) knowing about or being reckless as to the lack of
consent.
(4)(A) For subsection (3) being reckless as to a lack of
consent to sexual intercourse includes not giving any thought
to whether or not the other person is consenting to the sexual
intercourse. 10

6. See, for example, "Intention-Motive" of the Queensland Criminal Code Act, which

states:
(1) Subject to the express provisions of this Code relating to negligent acts and

omissions, a person is not criminally responsible for (a) an act or omission that
occurs independently of the exercise of the person's will; or (b) an event that (i)

the person does not intend or foresee as a possible consequence; and (ii) an
ordinary person would not reasonably foresee as a possible consequence.
1899 (Qld) s 23(1).
7. Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 349(1) (Austl.). See also Criminal Code Act
CompilationAct 1913 (WA) s 325 ("A person who sexually penetrates another person without
the consent of that person is guilty of a crime.... "); CriminalCode Act 1924 (Tas) s 185(1) ("Any
person who has sexual intercourse with another person without that person's consent is guilty of
a crime.").

8. Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), ch 4.1 and 5.1.
9. Id. at ch 3-5.
10. Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 192(3), (4A) (Austl.).
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It can be seen that the two alternative fault elements are knowledge or
recklessness, and that recklessness is further defined as including "not
giving any thought to whether or not the other person is consenting to the
sexual intercourse."u
The remaining three jurisdictions in Australia are New South Wales,
Victoria, and South Australia, which are referred to as "common law"
States, although each of these States also has significant statutory law:
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); and Criminal Law
ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA). As will be discussed in later sections, these
"common law" States have the most progressive legislation dealing with
rape and provide the bedrock of the advice from the Antipodes in
reforming the law of rape in the United States.
B. The Consistency of the VitiatingFactorsfor Consent
In the various criminal law jurisdictions in Australia, a consistent
definition of "consent" in the context of sexual offenses has emerged,
namely, a person is consenting when he or she gives "free and voluntary
agreement."' 2
The circumstances in which a person does not consent to sexual
intercourse as set out in Australian criminal law jurisdictions are broadly
similar, but there are some significant variations which require attention.
Given the common thread that runs through the lists of these
circumstances negating consent, it is unfortunate that such variations
exist. Thankfully, they are easily remediable. The position taken in this
Article is that the more exhaustive and comprehensive the list of
circumstances, the greater the clarity; this is especially true if the list is
buttressed by examples, such as the one used in Section 46(3)(h) of the
CriminalLaw ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA) discussed below.
In seeking a starting point in the selection of a criminal law
jurisdiction in Australia that sets out a comprehensive list of factors or
circumstances that vitiate consent, Sub-Section 36(2) of the Crimes Act
1958 (Vic) below stands out. Furthermore, the sub-section commences
by specifically stating that the list is not closed, thereby leaving open the
possibility of the exercise of judicial discretion to expand the number of
circumstances under which consent is vitiated based on a factual matrix
not originally envisaged or foreseen by those who drafted the legislation.
(2) Circumstances in which a person does not consent to an
act include, but are not limited to, the following11. Id.
12. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 268.14(3); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HE(2);

Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 192(1); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 348(1); Crimes Act 1958
(Vic) s 36(2); CriminalCode Act 1924 (Tas) s 2A(1); and Criminal Code Act Compilation Act
1913 (WA) s 319(2)(a). See also Criminal Law ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA) s 46(2).
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(a) the person submits to the act because of force or
the fear of force, whether to that person or someone else;
(b) the person submits to the act because of the fear
of harm of any type, whether to that person or someone else
or an animal;
(c) the person submits to the act because the person
is unlawfully detained;
(d) the person is asleep or unconscious;
(e) the person is so affected by alcohol or another
drug as to be incapable of consenting to the act;
(f) the person is so affected by alcohol or another
drug as to be incapable of withdrawing consent to the act;
Note
This circumstance may apply where
a person gave consent when not so
affected by alcohol or another drug
as to be incapable of consenting.
(g) the person is incapable of understanding the
sexual nature of the act;
(h) the person is mistaken about the sexual nature of
the act;
(i) the person is mistaken about the identity of any
other person involved in the act;
(j) the person mistakenly believes that the act is for
medical or hygienic purposes;
(k) if the act involves an animal, the person
mistakenly believes that the act is for veterinary, agricultural
or scientific research purposes;
(1) the person does not say or do anything to indicate
consent to the act;
(m) having initially given consent to the act, the
person later withdraws consent to the act taking place or
continuing. 13
As would be expected, the drafters of the legislation took into account
previous cases where the outcome was received with some disquiet, such

13. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 36(2).
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as with Sub-Section 36(2)(j) which has statutorily reversed R v Mobilio14
by providing that a person does not freely agree if they mistakenly believe
that the act is for medical or hygienic purposes. The common law position
in Mobilio was that the complainant was not mistaken as to the medical
procedure to be performed, and therefore the penetration was not rape.
The same logic applies if a person believing she or he has been through a
marriage ceremony, then engages in sexual intercourse with her or his
"married" partner in so far as the person is not mistaken as to the nature
of the sexual act and is deemed not to be rape despite the fact that the
person would not have consented if aware of the deception.
Australia usefully provides a statutory example in the equivalent to
Victoria's Sub-Section 36(2)(j) above, namely, Sub-Section 46(3)(h) of
the CriminalLaw ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA):
(h) the person is mistaken about the nature of the
activity.

ExampleA person is taken not to freely and
voluntarily agree to sexual activity if
the person agrees to engage in the
activity under the mistaken belief
that the activity is necessary for the
purpose of medical diagnosis,
investigation or treatment, or for the
purpose of hygiene. 15
The above example could be inserted under Sub-Section 36(2)0) of
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) which would helpfully explain how the SubSection is intended to operate.
Close examination of Sub-Section 36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)
reveals that the statutory language has a broad reach such as Sub-Section
36(2)(b) which covers the fear of harm of any type.1 6 The use of the word
"any" thereby includes non-physical threats such as economic reprisals,
blackmail, and reputational damage. Another example of the use of the
all-encompassing word "any" can be seen in Sub-Section 36(2)(i) where
mistaken identity covers "any other person involved in the act." 1 7 A
further example of the breadth of language employed can be seen in SubSection 36(2)(1) "the person does not say or do anything to indicate

14. (1991) 1 VR 339 (Austl.) (believing that penetration, by a medical instrument, was
being undertaken for medical diagnostic purposes, the victim allowed it to occur; however, the
procedure was unnecessary and engaged upon solely for the sexual gratification of the operator).

15. Criminal Law ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA) s 46(3)(h).
16. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 36(2)(b).
17. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 36(2)(i).
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consent to the act."1 8 In other words, even where the complainant is
passive to the extent of not saying or doing anything as regards
demonstrating consent, Sub-Section 36(2)(1) requires positive
communication on the part of the defendant. This follows as Sub-Section
36(2)(1) treats implied consent as not being "free and voluntary
agreement" because consent is required to be express consent, albeit
either by word ("say") or deed ("do"). The defendant is unable to assume
consent unless the complainant's words or deeds are positively explicit.
Sub-Section 36(2)(m) reflects the "continuing act" doctrine which
effectively deals with the situation where a person changes her or his
mind as regards engaging in sexual activity. Where the person initially
gives consent to sexual penetration but subsequently withdraws consent,
then under the "continuing act" doctrine, the offense of rape or sexual
penetration without consent is committed.1 9 Another relevant case to the
same effect is Kaitamaki v The Queen,2 0 where the Privy Council held
that the actus reus of sexual intercourse was a continuing act, but that
when the appellant realized consent was withdrawn and he therefore
formed the mens rea, the necessary coincidence for criminal
responsibility crystallized because he continued in the knowledge that the
act was no longer consensual. This doctrine is analogous to a situation
where a motorist may have accidently run over a policeman's foot when
the policeman was directing the motorist to park in a certain position, but
once the motorist ran over the policeman's foot and he directed the
motorist's attention to his pain, the motorist refused to move the vehicle
such was the case in Faganv MetropolitanPolice Commissioner.2 1
In stark comparison with Victoria, the least exhaustive list of factors
vitiating consent is presently to be found in Western Australia under SubSection 319(2)(a) of the CriminalCode Act CompilationAct (WA) where
"consent is not freely and voluntarily given if it is obtained by force,
threat, intimidation, deceit, or any fraudulent means." 2 2 This Article
18.
19.
20.
21.

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 36(2)(1).
See R v Mayberry [1973] Qd R 211, 212 (Austl.).
(1985) 1 AC 147 (Eng. & Wales).
[1969] 1 QB 439 (Eng. & Wales).

22. CriminalCode Act CompilationAct 1913 (WA) s 319(2)(a). The situation in the United
States regarding "deceit, or any fraudulent means" is little better. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-503(a)(4) (2020) (stating that consent is vitiated if "the sexual penetration is

accomplished by fraud"). See also TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-11-106(a)(9)(A) (2020) (stating that

consent is not effective when "induced by deception or coercion"). The term "coercion" is defined
in TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501 (2020), which is a statute that defines certain terms found in
the other Tennessee sexual offenses statutes, however neither of the terms "fraud" or "deception"
are defined in that section. For a discussion of the limitations of the treatment of rape by fraud in
criminal codes in the United States, see Michael Mullen, Rape by Fraud: Eluding Washington

Rape Statutes, 41

SEATTLE

U. L. REV. 1035 (2018). Mullen identifies rape by fraud as being
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contends that such open ended drafting leads to a need for the Western
Australian legislature to clarify. the reach of the last part of Sub-Section
319(2)(a) as it relates to vitiation of consent for "deceit, or any fraudulent
means." The obvious danger with such a broad definition is that it leaves
open what is meant by deceit or fraud and could potentially encompass
broken promises that the community would not consider vitiated consent
to sexual intercourse, such as promising to buy a horse or jewelry in
exchange for sexual intercourse. 2 3 Would, for example, a person who
impersonated a police officer to induce a prostitute to offer her services
for free or face "arrest," have committed rape? 2 4
This Article argues that rather than use broad open-ended language
which then requires judicial interpretation, legislatures should insert
separate sections to address deceit and fraud. Thus, if a person's consent
was conditional on the other person wearing a condom2 5 or withdrawing
his penis before ejaculating to avoid becoming pregnant, 2 6 acts
colloquially referred to as "stealthing," then it is preferable and better
defines criminal responsibility to have separate sections vitiating consent
that cover such eventualities than to attempt to lump all manner of
possibilities under an unconfined generic word as "fraud" or
"misrepresentation," which is potentially an overreach of criminal
responsibility. Under a criminal code which purports to contain the
criminal law, the citizen should be able to read the code and understand
where the lines of criminal responsibility are carved in the legislation.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis, as to the appropriate
definition of circumstances where consent is vitiated, is that unlike other
areas in the law of rape it would be a relatively straightforward matter to
both standardize and make explicit the list of factors which vitiate consent

perpetrated across six general categories (with some overlap): (1) fraudulent treatment, such as
fraudulent medical treatment to obtain sexual intercourse; (2) sexual impersonation; (3) sexual
scams, such as impersonation of an agent in the entertainment industry; (4) sexual theft, such as
refusal to pay a sex worker; (5) abuse of authority, such as educators, police, and employers
utilizing their positions to leverage sexual complicity against victims; and (6) sexual extortion,
where a person exploits his or her power derived from his or her relationship with the victim.

23. See R. v. Winchester [2011] QCA 374 T¶ 84-85 (Austl.).
24. Michaelv. State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 66 (Austl.).
25. See Assange v. Swedish ProsecutionAuth. [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2849 (U.K.). See

also R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 346 (Can.) (stating the appellant had
sabotaged the condom by poking holes in the condom and the complainant became pregnant
against her express wishes. The conviction was upheld on the basis that condom protection was
an "essential feature" of the sexual activity, and therefore the complainant did not consent to the
"sexual activity in question." Essentially, the Supreme Court of Canada preferred the view that
there was no voluntary agreement by the complainant to engage in the "sexual activity in
question," rather than taking the view that the condom sabotage constituted fraud with the result
that no consent was obtained.).

26. See R. v. DPP [2014] QB 581 (U.K.).
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for sexual offenses across Australian criminal law jurisdictions. The same
reasoning applies to the United States.
The thrust of the argument being made here is that the benchmark or
best practice for the list of circumstances vitiating consent needs to be as
comprehensive (all encompassing) as possible, including the use of
examples, without leaving the statutory language so open as to shed doubt
as to the reach of the section such as in Sub-Section 319(2)(a) of the
Criminal Code Act CompilationAct (WA) where the reach of the phrase
"deceit, or any fraudulent means" has caused difficulty. This argument
applies to all legislation, including in the United States, where the
statutory language is open-ended and requires judicial interpretation. For
Australia, it is suggested that the starting point for the design of a
comprehensive list of factors which vitiate consent for sexual offenses is
Sub-Section 36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).
C. The Consistency of the FaultElementsfor Rape
As a result of the mosaic of criminal law jurisdictions in Australia,
with its mix of common law, statutes and codes, unsurprisingly an
examination of the fault elements for rape across Australian jurisdictions
reveals that there are marked differences in approach for the necessary
mental elements to sheet home criminal responsibility, ranging from strict
liability in the Griffith Codes to knowledge or recklessness. However,
knowledge or recklessness are the fault elements for four Australian
jurisdictions. 2 7 As such, knowledge and recklessness provide the base for
building consistent fault elements for rape in Australia.
At this juncture in the analysis, it should be made clear that an
examination of fault elements also includes out of necessity the treatment
of mistake of fact and intoxication as defenses, even though on one view
such defenses are not strictly fault elements. One reason for this approach
is that the Griffith Codes of Queensland, Tasmania, and Western
Australia, by failing to specify a fault element, effectively treat rape as a
crime of strict liability. 2 8 The wording of these provisions yields the result
that if sexual intercourse has taken place and consent is the issue, then
mistake of fact is the only defense to a strict liability offense. In other
words, the absence of a fault element forces the defendant to rely on the
defense of mistake of fact, which has the effect of running a defense into
the fault element. Reliance on mistake of fact can be buttressed with the
defense of intoxication, especially if both parties had consumed alcohol
or drugs at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

27. Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 54; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61 HE; Criminal Code Act 1983
(NT) s 192(3); and CriminalLaw ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA) s 48.
28. CriminalCode Act 1899 (Qld) s 349; CriminalCode Act 1924 (Tas) s 185; and Criminal
Code Act CompilationAct 1913 (WA) s 325.
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1. Fault Elements
The starting point of this examination is to consider those jurisdictions
that specifically identify knowledge and recklessness as fault elements
for rape. Section 192 of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) has already been
mentioned in Part A above dealing with Australia's criminal law
landscape. 29
In South Australia, Section 48(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation
Act 1935 (SA), which deals with the crime of rape, like the Northern
Territory, also specifies knowledge (awareness) and recklessness as
alternative fault elements.
48-Rape
(1) A person (the "offender") is guilty of the offense of rape
if he or she engages, or continues to engage, in sexual
intercourse with another person who(a) does not consent to engaging in the sexual
intercourse; or

(b)

has

withdrawn

consent

to

the sexual

intercourse,

and the offender knows, or is recklessly indifferent to, the
fact that the other person does not so consent or has so
withdrawn consent (as the case may be).30
The phrase "recklessly indifferent" in Sub-Section 48(1) above is
defined in Section 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).
47-Reckless indifference
For the purposes of this Division, a person is "recklessly
indifferent to the fact that another person does not consent to
an act, or has withdrawn consent" to an act, if he or she
(a) is aware of the possibility that the other person
might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent
to the act, but decides to proceed regardless of that
possibility; or
(b) is aware of the possibility that the other person
might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent
to the act, but fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain
whether the other person does in fact consent, or has in fact
withdrawn consent, to the act before deciding to proceed; or

29. See supra note 10, Part I.A).

30. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 48(1).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1

12

2IRIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32

'

(c) does not give any thought as to whether or not
the other person is consenting to the act, or has withdrawn
consent to the act before deciding to proceed. 3
As can be seen, Section 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act
1935 (SA) specifies three alternative ways in which the fault element of
"reckless indifference" is satisfied. Both Sub-Section 47(a) and SubSection 47(b) require an awareness of the possibility that the other person
might not be consenting, either by proceeding regardless of that
possibility (advertent recklessness) or by failing to take reasonable steps
(an objective test) to ascertain whether the act is consensual before
deciding to proceed (culpable inadvertence). 3 2 The third alternative, set
out in Sub-Section 47(c), in which a person does not give any thought to
consent before deciding.to proceed, mirrors Sub-Section 192(4A) of the
Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) discussed above in Part II.A. Judged by
the criterion of comprehensiveness, Section 47 of the Criminal Law
ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA), usefully covers the field and provides a
model definition of the fault element of "recklessness."
Thus, a baseline position for ascribing criminal responsibility for rape
(sexual intercourse without consent) would be to specify the alternative
fault elements of "knowledge," and "recklessness" as found in the
definition of "reckless indifference" contained in Section 47 of the
CriminalLaw ConsolidationAct 1935 (SA). 3 3
This then invites comparison with the treatment of the fault elements
of rape in New South Wales which also specifies the alternative fault
elements of knowledge and recklessness in Sub-Sections 61HE(3) and
(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
(3) Knowledge about consent
A person who without the consent of the other person (the
'alleged victim') engages in a sexual activity with or
towards the alleged victim, incites the alleged victim to
engage in a sexual activity or incites a third person to engage
in a sexual activity with or towards the alleged victim,
knows that the alleged victim does not consent to the sexual
activity if:
(a) the person knows that the alleged victim does not consent
to the sexual activity, or
(b) the person is reckless as to whether the alleged victim
consents to the sexual activity, or

31. Jd. at s 47.
32. See R. v. Banditt [2004] NSWCCA 208

¶¶ 78-79 (Austl.).

33. See supra note 28, at s 47.
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(c) the person has no reasonable grounds for believing that
the alleged victim consents to the sexual activity.
(4) For the purpose of making any such finding, the trier of
fact must have regard to all the circumstances of the case:
(a) including any steps taken by the person to ascertain
whether the alleged victim consents to the sexual activity,
but
(b) not including any self-induced intoxication of the

person. 34

Significantly, Sub-Section 61HE(3)(c) specifies an additional
alternative fault element to knowledge and recklessness in the form of no
reasonable grounds for believing the other person was consenting, which
has the purpose of negating the defense of mistake of fact and will be
further discussed in the next section.35 Under Sub-Section 61HE(3) of the
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), each of the three alternative fault elements as
to consent (knowledge, recklessness, or no reasonable grounds for belief)
are to be determined by all the circumstances of the case including any
steps taken to ascertain consent, however self-induced intoxication is
excluded. 3 6
By contrast, the treatment of the offense of rape in the remaining
Australian jurisdictions is inadequate, especially in the three Griffith
Codes because of the failure to specify a fault element. However, of more
significance is the failure to specify an objective test to ascertain whether
or not the other person was consenting, given under the Griffith Codes
the defendant must rely on the defense of mistake of fact. The need for
an objective as opposed to a subjective test for mistake of fact is explained
in the next section.
2. Mistake of Fact
Section 61HE(3)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), discussed above,
opens up the possibility of adding the fault element of "no reasonable
grounds for believing" the other person was consenting to the baseline
position previously identified of knowledge and reckless indifference
contained in Section 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935
(SA). The use of the word "reasonable" imports an objective test. The
34. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HE(3), (4).
35. See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61 HE(3)(c) (Austl.) (statutory statement of honest and

reasonable, but mistaken, belief). See also Bank ofN.S. W. v. Piper [1897] AC 383, 389-90 (Austl.)
("[T]he absence of mens rea really consists in an honest and reasonable belief entertained by the
accused of the existence of facts which, if true, would make the act charged against him
innocent.").

36. See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61 HIE(4).
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term "no reasonable belief' is also to be found in Section 38(1)(c) of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).
Section 38 Rape
(1) A person (A) commits an offense if(a) (A) intentionally sexually penetrates another person (B);

and
(b) (B) does not consent to the penetration; and
(c) (A) does not reasonably believe that B consents to the
penetration. 37
Reasonable belief in consent is defined in Section 36A of the Crimes
Act 1958 (Vic). 38 Section 36A(2) refers to any steps the person has taken
to establish if the other person is consenting. 9
Thus, Section 36A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) has the effect of
replacing the excuse of mistake of fact (doing an act under an honest and
reasonable, but mistaken, belief) for the purpose of establishing whether
or not the other person was consenting to sexual intercourse. This is
achieved by virtue of embedding a specific test within Section 36A of
Part 1, Division 1-Offenses Against the Person, of the Crimes Act 1958
(Vic), rather than relying on a generic mistake of fact provision across all
Parts of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).
3. Intoxication
As the person is often intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense,
Sub-Section 36B(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) deals with the effect
of self-induced intoxication on reasonable belief.4 0 The test is objective
37. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 38(1) (Austl.). Note that Section 38(1)(c)implies that intending
to sexually penetrate another person is not usually in dispute. The issue is one of consent and
whether A had a reasonable belief that B was consenting. Victoria has sought to minimize the
reach of mistake of fact through an objective test.

38. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 36(A).
Section 36A Reasonable belief in consent
(1) Whether or not a person reasonably believes that another person is consenting
to an act depends on the circumstances.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the circumstances include any steps that the
person has taken to find out whether the other person consents.

39. Id.
40. See Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 36B(I)(a) (Austl.) (focusing on the relevance of evidence
of intoxication as it relates to the mental element (mens rea), as opposed to the relevance of

evidence of intoxication as it relates to a claim of mistaken belief as to the existence of consent).
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in that the standard to be applied is that of a reasonable person who is not
intoxicated.
Section 36B Effect of intoxication on reasonable belief
(1) In determining whether a person who is intoxicated has
a reasonable belief at any time
(a) if the intoxication is self-induced, regard must be had to
the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated
and who is otherwise in the same circumstances as that
person at the relevant time. 4 1
Thus, it can be seen that Section 36A and Section 36B work in
tandem in that both sections contain objective tests. Section 36A
requires that the circumstances surrounding the person's
reasonable belief in consent is measured objectively by the steps
the person took to ascertain consent, while Section 36B replaces
the subjective belief of the intoxicated person with an objective
standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated, which by
virtue of Sub-Section 38(1)(c) above goes to the mental element
("A does not reasonably believe that B consents to the
penetration") rather than mistake of fact. 42
D. ProposedModel Provisionfor Rape
Consent means free and voluntary agreement 43 and the starting point
for the design of a comprehensive list of factors which vitiate consent for
sexual offenses is Sub-Section 36(2) of the CrimesAct 1958 (Vic) above.
As to the appropriate fault elements, reasonable belief in consent and the
effect of self-induced intoxication, the following model provision for rape
is proposed.`
(1) A person is guilty of rape if the person has sexual
intercourse with another person:
(a) without the other person's consent; and
(b) knowing about the lack of consent, or being
recklessly indifferent as to the lack of consent, or having no
reasonable grounds for believing the other person was
consenting.

41. Id.
42. Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 36A, 36B, 38(1)(c) (Austl.).
43. See discussion infra Part I.B.
44. For a fuller treatment of this proposed model provision for rape, see Andrew Hemming,

In Search of a Model Provisionfor Rape in Australia, 38(1) U. TAs. L. REV. 72 (2019).
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(2) For the purpose of this sub-section, the following
definitions apply:
(a) Knowledge: A person has knowledge of a result or
circumstance if the person is aware that it.exists or will exist
in the ordinary course of events.

-

(b) Recklessly indifferent: a person is recklessly
indifferent to the fact that another person does not consent to
an act, or has withdrawn consent to an act, if he or she
(i) is aware of the possibility that the other
person might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn
consent to the act, but decides to proceed regardless of that
possibility; or
(ii) is aware of the possibility that the other
person might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn
consent to the act, but fails to take reasonable steps to
ascertain whether the other person does in fact consent, or
has in fact withdrawn consent, to the act before deciding to
proceed; or
(iii) does not give any thought as to whether or
not the other person is consenting to the act, or has
withdrawn consent to the act before deciding to proceed.
(3) For the purpose of sub-section (1)(b), reasonable belief
in consent depends on the circumstances known to a person
at the time and includes any reasonable physical or verbal
steps a person has taken to ascertain whether the other person
is consenting.
Example
Where a person forms a belief about
ambiguous
in
consent
circumstances, such as where the
other person is very tired or
adversely affected by alcohol,
without taking reasonable physical
or verbal steps to determine if the
other person consents.
Standard
At a minimum, it will be reasonable
for the defendant to take at least
some physical or verbal steps to find
out whether the other person is
consenting.
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(4) In determining whether a person who is intoxicated is
aware of the possibility that the other person might not be
consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act, or
has a reasonable belief at any time, if the intoxication is selfinduced, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable
person who is not intoxicated and who is otherwise in the
same circumstances as that person at the relevant time.
The justification for such a broad provision for the offense of rape
(sexual intercourse without consent) is: (1) comprehensiveness; (2)
clarity; (3) consistency; and (4) maximizing the reach of criminal
responsibility for rape by the inclusion of objective tests. These objective
tests are found in the definition of the fault element of "recklessly
indifferent;" in the reasonable steps test to ascertain whether the other
person is consenting; and in the standard of the reasonable person who is
not intoxicated. The overall purpose is to make the test of mistaken belief
in consent more objective and less subjective, as well as to make the
process of adjudging guilt for rape more objective.
Having examined relevant rape provisions in Australia and set out a
proposal for a comprehensive model provision for the crime of rape, the
next Part will consider rape offenses in the United States, with a view to
establishing whether the proposed model provision above both could and
should be incorporated into all criminal jurisdictions in the United States.

II.

RAPE OFFENSES IN THE UNITED STATES

A. UnitedStates Model Penal Code
There is a general academic consensus that, prior to the Model Penal
Code of 1962, "substantive criminal law . . . was often archaic,
inconsistent, unfair, and unprincipled." 4 5 The Model Penal Code
stimulated the widespread revision and codification of the substantive
criminal law of the United States. One of the Model Penal Code's
objectives was to simplify and rationalize common law offense
definitions. 46 Under the Model Penal Code, an offense consists of
physical and mental (fault) elements. 4 7 Physical elements can be conduct,
a result of conduct, or a related circumstance. 48 The Model Penal Code
45. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of CriminalLaw: An OpinionatedReview, 87 CALIF. L.
REv. 943, 947 (1999) (citing Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge ofa Model PenalCode, 65 HARV.

L. REV. 1097, 1100-01 (1952)). See also Joshua Dressler, The Model Penal Code: Is It Like a
Classic Movie in Need ofa Remake?, 1 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 157, 157 (2003); Paul H. Robinson
& Markus D. Dubber, The American Model PenalCode: A BriefOverview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
319, 322-23 (2007).
46. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief

Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 319, 334 (2007).
47. See generally id.

48. Id
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specifies four fault elements: purpose, knowledge, recklessness or
negligence. 4 9 The Model Penal Code was an exhaustive attempt to match,
in a binary geometric pattern, a physical element with a requisite fault
element. The Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) discussed in Part II is based on
the Model Penal Code.
This design sought to remove the confusion as to the mens rea of a
given offense, within the common law, by breaking down a criminal
offense into objective elements with a specified mental state. 50 This
breakdown was a radical change. The division of the amorphous term
mens rea into just four defined mental states both simplified the law and
gave the legislature, rather than the judiciary, control over criminal law.
However, setting out offense elements is but the first step in ascribing
criminal liability.
Further, under Article 3, the Model Penal Code states that justification
-such as necessity, execution of public duty, and self-protection-is an
affirmative defense.5 1 Even if the conduct is unjustified under Article 3,
there remains the final step under the excuse defenses in Article 2 (such
as mistake, intoxication, or duress)12 or the responsibility defenses in
Article 4 (such as mental disease or defect, excluding responsibility).5 3
For present purposes, knowingly and recklessly are defined in the
Model Penal Code in Section 2.02(2)(b) and (c), respectfully, as:
2.02 General Requirements of Culpability.

(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element
of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. L. INST. 1984).
50. See Robinson & Dubber, supranote 45, at 335.
51. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.01-.04 (AM. L. INST. 1984).

52. Id.
53. Id.

§§ 2.04, .08, .09.
§ 4.01.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/1

18

Hemming: Reforming the Law of Rape in the United States: Some Advice from

REFORMING THE

2020]

IAW OF RAPE IN THE UNIT ED ST ATES

19

and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard. of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor's situation. 54
Similarly, mistake of fact is covered in Section 2.04(1):
2.04 Ignorance or Mistake.
(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a
defense if:
(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose,
knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to
establish a material element of the offense; or
(b) the law provides that the state of mind established by
such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.5 5
The excuse defense of mistake of fact is bound up with the consent
defense which goes to the heart of a rape defense, namely, that the
defendant honestly (bonafide) and reasonably believed the prosecutrix 56
was consenting. Importantly, Section 2.04(1)(b) provides for a subjective
test in the form of "the state of mind established by such mistake" to
constitute a defense. 57
B. Impact andJudicialInterpretationof Model Penal Code
One view of the impact of the rape and sexual assault provisions of
the Model Penal Code (MPC) can be found in a Women's Law Project
published in 2012.58
Written in 1962, the MPC defines rape as "sexual intercourse with a
female not his wife" by force or threat of severe harm. 59 Under the MPC's
terms, rape is not a felony of the first degree if there is no serious bodily
harm or if the victim was a voluntary social companion and had

54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. L. INST. 1984).
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 1984).
56. A female victim of a crime on whose behalf the state is prosecuting a suspect.
57. MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 55, at-§2.04(1)(b).
58. See Carol E. Tracy et al., Rape and Sexual Assault in the Legal System, Women's Law
Project and AEquitas, 5-6 (June 5, 2012), https://www.womenslawproject.org/wp-content/
[https://perma.cc/
uploads/2016/04/Rape-and-Sexual-Assault-in-the-Legal-System-FINAL.pdf

4QX5-LDXD].
59. MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 213.1

(AM. L. INST.
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previously permitted "sexual liberties." 60 The MPC includes the long
outdated requirements of resistance, reporting of the sex crime to the
police within three months, and corroboration of a victim's testimony as
well as age-related provisions that are inconsistent with contemporary
understanding of adolescent sexual abuse.61
Sweeping sex crime law reform began in the 1970s. 62 Feminists
rejected the notion that women are the property of men without
independent legal status or rights and demanded changes in the laws. As
a result of this activism, most states have expanded the definitions of sex
crimes to eliminate disparities based on gender and marital status. They
have also rescinded the requirements of resistance, corroboration, and
reporting requirements and prohibited introduction of a woman's past
sexual history. 63 It is now well-established that penetration of orifices
other than the vagina is a felony. Issues of force and consent continue to
change but clear trends in the evolution of the law are identifiable. The
definition of force is broadening beyond overt physical force alone to
include other modes of coercion. There is an increasing recognition that
penetration without consent or any additional force beyond penetration is
a serious sexual offense.64 These trends demonstrate the growing
understanding that unwanted and unconsented to bodily invasion is the
core wrong that sex crimes laws must address. 65
An example of the trends in sexual offenses law reform can be found
in Section 261 of the California Penal Code. It can be seen that Section
261 does not specify a fault element for the offense of rape, or define rape
as an act of sexual intercourse without consent."6 Instead, the absence of
consent is implied by virtue of the act of sexual intercourse being
accomplished under a list of circumstances such as by means of force or
where the person was asleep. 67
60. Id.
61. Id. §§213.1, .6.
62. See Brief for A Woman's Place Civil Legal Assistance Program et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 19-21, Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 2:06-cv-

1080).
63. These laws are known as "rape shield" laws and prohibit the introduction of the victim's
past sexual history unless it is with the accused.

64. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 263 (2020) ("The essential guilt of rape consists in the

outrage to the person and feelings of the victim of the rape. Any sexual penetration, however
slight, is sufficient to complete the crime."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1113 (2020).

65. See, e.g., State in the Interest ofM. TS., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992).
66. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (2020).
67. Similarly, under FLA. STAT. § 794.01 1(4)(b) (2019) "a person 18 years of age or older
who commits sexual battery upon a person 18 years of age or older without that person's consent,
under any of the circumstances listed in paragraph (e), commits a felony of the first degree."

Paragraph (e) of Section 794.011, lists a number of circumstances which vitiate consent which
inter alia include (e)(1) the victim is physically helpless to resist; (e)(2)-(3) the offender coerces
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(a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the
following circumstances:
(1) Where a person is incapable, because of a mental
disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving
legal consent, and this is known or reasonably should be
known to the person committing the act. Notwithstanding
the existence of a conservatorship pursuant to the provisions
of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Part 1 (commencing with
Section 5000) of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code), the prosecuting attorney shall prove, as an element of
the crime, that a mental disorder or developmental or
physical disability rendered the alleged victim incapable of
giving consent.
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by
means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or
another.
(3) Where a person is prevented from resisting by any
intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled
substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably
should have been known by the accused.
(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature
of the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this
paragraph, "unconscious of the nature of the act" means
incapable of resisting because the victim meets any one of
the following conditions:
(A) Was unconscious or asleep.
(B) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that
the act occurred.
(C) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's
fraud in fact.
(D) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the
essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator's
fraudulent representation that the sexual penetration served
a professional purpose when it served no professional
purpose.

the victim to submit; (e)(4) the offender administers a substance to the victim which incapacitates

the victim; and (e)(6) the victim is physically incapacitated.
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(5) Where a person submits under the belief that the person
committing the act is someone known to the victim other
than the accused, and this belief is induced by any artifice,
pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with
intent to induce the belief.
(6) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will
by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or
any other person, and there is a reasonable possibility that
the perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this
paragraph, "threatening to retaliate" means a threat to kidnap
or falsely imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily
injury, or death.
(7) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will
by threatening to use the authority of a public official to
incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim or another, and the
victim has a reasonable belief that the perpetrator is a public
official. As used in this paragraph, "public official" means a
person employed by a governmental agency who has the
authority, as part of that position, to incarcerate, arrest, or
deport another. The perpetrator does not actually have to be
a public official.
(b) As used in this section, "duress" means a direct or
implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution
sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary
susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not
have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one
otherwise would not have submitted. The total
circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her
relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in
appraising the existence of duress.
(c) As used in this section, "menace" means any threat,
declaration, or act which shows an intention to inflict an
injury upon another. 68
On the issue of consent, California Penal Code Section 261.6 defines
"consent" as positive cooperation, 69 Section 261.7 states that a
communication to the defendant to use a condom without more does not
constitute consent, 7 0 and Section 266c covers the situation where consent
was procured by pretense to induce fear which would cause a reasonable

68. CAL. PENAL CODE
69. CAL. PENAL CODE
70. CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 263 (Deering 2020).
§ 261.6 (2020).
§ 261.7 (2020).
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person in like circumstances to act contrary to the person's free will
(objective test). 7 1
Section 261.6.
In [rape] prosecutions .. . in which consent is at issue,
"consent" shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in
act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person
must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the
nature of the act or transaction involved. A current or
previous dating or marital relationship shall not be sufficient
to constitute consent where consent is at issue in a [rape]
prosecution ... . 7 2
Section 261.7.
In [rape] prosecutions . . . in which consent is at issue,
evidence that the victim suggested, requested, or otherwise
communicated to the defendant that the defendant use a
condom or other birth control device, without additional
evidence of consent, is not sufficient to constitute consent. 73
Section 266c.
Every person who induces any other person to engage in
sexual intercourse, sexual penetration, oral copulation, or
sodomy when his or her consent is procured by false or
fraudulent representation or pretense that is made with the
intent to create fear, and which does induce fear, and that
would cause a reasonable person in like circumstances to act
contrary to the person's free will, and does cause the victim
to so act, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for
not more than one year or in the state prison for two, three,
or four years.
As used in this section, "fear" means the fear of physical
injury or death to the person or to any relative of the person
or member of the person's family. 74
In terms of instructions to the jury, the California Penal Code is
supplemented by the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury

71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c (2020).
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (2020); Cf FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(a) (2019) ("'Consent'
means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent, and does not include coerced submission.
'Consent' shall not be deemed or construed to mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer
physical resistance to the offender.").
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.7 (2020).
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c (2020).
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Instructions (CALCRIM). 75 CALCRIM sets out the elements of the crime
of rape that the prosecution must prove, and as in Australia, consent is
defined as free and voluntary agreement.76
The CALCRIM instruction for rape or spousal rape by force, fear, or
threats reads:
To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that:
1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman;
2. He and the woman were (not married/married) to each
other at the time of the intercourse;
3. The woman did not consent to the intercourse;
AND
4. The defendant accomplished the intercourse by
<Alternative 4A-force or fear>
[force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury to the woman or to someone else.]
<Alternative 4B-future threats of bodily harm>
[threatening to retaliate in the future against the woman or
someone else when there was a reasonable possibility that
the defendant would carry out the threat. A threat to retaliate
is a threat to kidnap, falsely imprison, or inflict extreme pain,
serious bodily injury, or death.]
<Alternative 4C-threat of official action>
[threatening to use the authority of a public office to
incarcerate, arrest, or deport someone. A public official is a
person employed by federal, state, or local government who
has authority to incarcerate, arrest, or deport. The woman
must have reasonably believed that the defendant was a
public official even if he was not.]
Sexual intercourse means any penetration, no matter how
slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is
not required.]

75. Jud. Council of Cal. Advisory Comm. on Crim. Jury Instructions, CALCRIM No. 1000,
in JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 749, 749

(2020).

76. Id. at 713.
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[To consent, a woman must act freely and voluntarily and
know the nature of the act.] 77
The instruction, which also covers the defense of reasonable belief in
consent, further states: 78
[The defendant is not guilty of rape if he actually and
reasonably believed that the woman consented to the
intercourse [and actually and reasonably believed that she
consented throughout the act of intercourse]. The People
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the
woman consented. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find the defendant not guilty.]
The Bench Notes in CALCRIM give the following instructional duty
regarding the defense of reasonable belief in consent. 79
Defenses-Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte (of its own accord) duty to
instruct on the defense of reasonable belief in consent if there
is "substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would
have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe
consent existed where it did not." (See People v. Williams
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 354]; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d
143, 153-158 [125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)
In People v. Williams,80 the California Supreme Court took the
opportunity to consider its own previous authority in People v.
Mayberry.8 1 The leading judgment for the majority was given by Arabian
J.82

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.

Id. at 750.
Id. at 751.
Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 964 (Cal. 1992).
Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975).

82. Mayberry, 841 P.2d at 964-66. For a critique of People v. Williams, see Rosanna
Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 815 (1996). Cavallaro states that:
By allowing the defense only where the evidence of consent is "equivocal,"
courts are establishing a standard for an instruction of mistake that has been
applied in no other context in which the mistake defense arises. This new rule of
equivocality imposes limits on the role of the jury that are unique to rape, adding
the defense of mistake of fact to a growing array of procedural and substantive
rules of law that have singular application to that offense.
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In People v. Mayberry .. . this court held that a defendant's
reasonable and good faith mistake of fact regarding a
person's consent to sexual intercourse is a defense to
rape. ... Mayberry is predicated on the notion that under
section 26,83 reasonable mistake of fact regarding consent is
incompatible with the existence of wrongful intent....
The Mayberry defense has two components, one subjective,
and one objective. The subjective component asks whether
the defendant honestly and in good faith, albeit mistakenly,
believed that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.84 In
order to satisfy this component, a defendant must adduce
evidence of the victim's equivocal conduct on the. basis of
which he erroneously believed there was consent.
In addition, the defendant must satisfy the objective
component, which asks whether the defendant's mistake
regarding consent was reasonable under the circumstances.
Thus, regardless of how strongly a defendant may
subjectively believe a person has consented to sexual
intercourse, that belief must be formed under circumstances
society will tolerate as reasonable in order for the defendant
to have adduced substantial evidence giving rise to
a Mayberry instruction....
The defendant bears the burden of raising a reasonable doubt
as to whether he harbored a reasonable and good faith but
mistaken belief of consent . . . "and then only if the
prosecution's proof did not of itself raise such a doubt."

(People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 660, 694...)
In Mayberry, we held that a requested instruction regarding
mistake of fact was required when "some evidence
'deserving of ... consideration"' existed to support that
contention.. . . In People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 668,
684-85 ... and fn. 12, we further explained that a trial court
must give a requested instruction only when the defense is
supported by "substantial evidence," that is, evidence
sufficient to "deserve consideration by the jury," not
"whenever any evidence is presented, no matter how weak."
83. The court notes that Section 26 provides in part: "All persons are capable of committing
crimes except those belonging to the following classes: . . . (3) Persons who committed the act or
made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal
intent." CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (2020) (citing People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 975 n.4 (Cal.
1992).
84. Consent for purposes of rape prosecutions is defined as "positive cooperation in act or
attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have
knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (2020)

(citing People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 975 n.6 (Cal. 1992).
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Thus, in determining whether the Mayberry instruction
should be given, the trial court must examine whether there
is substantial evidence that the defendant honestly and
reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that the victim
consented to sexual intercourse.
Williams asserts that "a successful Mayberry defense does
not require a jury finding that the defendant's belief was
mistaken." However, as the language implies, a mistake of
fact occurs when one perceives facts differently from how
they actually exist....
Thus, because the Mayberry instruction is premised on
mistake of fact, the instruction should not be given absent
substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have
led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe
consent existed where it did not. As one author has
explained, under the reasonable mistake defense, "a woman
is raped but not by a rapist." (Berliner, Rethinking the
Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape (1991) 100 YALE L.J.

2687, 2695, fn.56.)8 5

Thus, the defense of mistake of fact must satisfy the evidential onus
of a reasonable possibility that the matter exists or does not exist. 86 In R.
v. Barton,87 the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that the availability
of the defense of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent
was not unlimited by stating:
An accused who wishes to rely on the defence of honest but
mistaken belief in communicated consent must first
demonstrate that there is an air of reality to the defence. This
necessarily requires that the trial judge consider whether
there is any evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
acting judicially could find (1) that the accused took
reasonable steps to ascertain consent and (2) that the accused
honestly believed the complainant communicated consent.
This Court recently confirmed that where there is no
evidence upon which the trier of fact could find that the
accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent, the
defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated
consent must not be left with the jury (see R. v. Gagnon,
2018 SCC 41).88

85.
86.
87.
88.

People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 965-66 (Cal. 1992).
See, e.g., Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 13.3(6) (Austl.).
2019 SCC 33, [2019] 435 D.L.R. 191 (Can.).
Id. at ¶ 121.
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As Arabian J. observed in the California People v. Williamsjudgment
above, the defense of mistake of fact has two components: honest and in
good faith (subjective) and reasonable under the circumstances
(objective).8 9 The inclusion of the word "reasonable" at least avoids the
wholly subjective common law test set out in the British court case
Directorof Public Prosecutionsv. Morgan90 whereby the court held that
honest belief that the complainant was consenting can be unreasonable.91
However, the danger remains that the courts will give a liberal
interpretation to "evidence of the victim's equivocal conduct," as has
occurred in a series of judgments delivered by the Queensland Court of
Appeal in Australia, such as: R. v. Parsons,9 2 R. v. Mrzljak,93 R. v.
Kovacs,94 R. v. Dunrobin,95 and R. v. Phillips.9 6
For example, in R. v. Dunrobin, the complainant's evidence was that
she had physically resisted the appellant and consistently told him to stop,
although at some point she admitted she had frozen because she was
scared. 97 The trial judge directed the jury on mistake of fact under Section
24 of the CriminalCode 1899 (Qld) in these terms:
[31] Now, the complainant says that she did not consent. If
you accept the complainant's evidence that the defendant
touched her breasts and put his fingers and then his penis in
her vagina against her wishes, you might think the defendant
could not have honestly and reasonably believed the
complainant was consenting. 9 8
Muir, JA (with whom Fryberg, and Lyons, JJ agreed) held, at [32],
that the trial judge's direction to the jury on mistake of fact under Section
24 was deficient in stating acceptance of the complainant's evidence,
which meant it was unlikely that the defendant thought the victim was
consenting.
[32] The primary judge says in effect, "if you accept the
complainant's evidence that she didn't consent you might
think it unlikely that the defendant thought she was
consenting." A defence under s 24 of the Criminal Code in a
89. Williams, 841 P.2d at 966.
90. [1975] UKHL 3, [1976] AC 182 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
91. Id The decision in Morgan has been statutorily overruled by virtue of §

1(1)(c)

of the

Sexual Offenses Act of 2003 which states: "A person (A) commits an offense if ... A does not
reasonably believe that B consents." Sexual Offenses Act of 2003, c. 42, § l(1)(c) (UK).
92. Parsons,[2001] Qd R 655 (Austl.).
93. Mrzliak, [2005] Qd R 308 (Austl.).
94. Kovacs, [2007] QCA 143 (Austl.).
95. Dunrobin, [2008] QCA 116 (Austl.).
96. Phillips, [2009] QCA 57 (Austl.).
97. Dunrobin,supra note 95.

98. Id. ¶ 31.
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matter such as this arises only where there is, in fact, no
consent. The mere fact of touching and digital and penile
penetration said nothing about the existence of a Section 24
defence. Relevant to that defence was the appellant's state of
mind and what was said and done at relevant times which
bore on the existence or non-existence of that state of mind. 9
More importantly, under Section 261 of the California Penal Code,
the lack of a fault element implies rape is a strict liability offense, with
only mistake of fact available as a defense.1 00 From a practical
perspective, the classification of the offense of rape as one of strict
liability is artificial as the offense requires lack of consent, and a
defendant who pleads not guilty is normally pleading that the sexual
intercourse was consensual. Furthermore, Section 26 of the California
Penal Code is a generic section with no particular reference to rape or the
sexual offenses provisions, and contains both a subjective element
("honest") and an objective element ("reasonable").101 This has required
the California Supreme Court to fill in the blanks so to speak in the form
of limiting the reach of the defense of mistake of fact to equivocal conduct
in People v. Williams. 0 2 Thus, to argue that California Penal Code rape
provisions are more victim-centric because they are strict liability
offenses combined with a mistake of fact provision that requires the
mistaken belief to be honest and reasonable, overlooks the need to define
the fault element for rape (such as reckless indifference) and at the same
time to specify the limits of mistaken belief in consent where it applies to
rape (proceeding regardless of the possibility of lack of consent, failure
to take reasonable steps or not giving any thought as to consent).
Arguably, the most high-profile mistake of fact defense to a charge of
rape in the United States occurred in 2003 in Colorado, where the
defendant was Kobe Bryant, a basketball star with the Los Angeles
Lakers. 03 The case never went to trial as the alleged victim refused to
testify. However, after the criminal case was dismissed, Bryant released
the following statement:
First, I want to apologize directly to the young woman
involved in this incident. I want to apologize to her for my
behavior that night and for the consequences she has
suffered in the past year. Although this year has been
incredibly difficult for me personally, I can only imagine the
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. ¶ 32.
CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 261 (2020).

CAL. PENAL CODE §,26 (2020).

Williams, 841 P.2d at 968.

103. Kevin Draper, Kobe Bryant and the Sexual Assault Case That Was Dropped but Not
Forgotten, NY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020) https:/www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/sports/basketball/
kobe-bryant-rape-case.html [https://perma.cc/7ZH2-U2TB].
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pain she has had to endure. I also want to apologize to her
parents and family members, and to my family and friends
and supporters, and to the citizens of Eagle, Colorado. I also
want to make it clear that I do not question the motives of
this young woman. No money has been paid to this woman.
She has agreed that this statement will not be used against
me in the civil case. Although I truly believe this encounter
between us was consensual, I recognize now that she did not
and does not view this incident the same way I did. After.
months of reviewing discovery, listening to her attorney, and
even her testimony in person, I now understand how she
feels that she did not consent to this encounter. I issue this
statement today fully aware that while one part of this case
ends today, another remains. I understand that the civil case
against me will go forward. That part of this case will be
decided by and between the parties directly involved in the
incident and will no longer be a financial or emotional drain
on the citizens of the state of Colorado.104
Speculation as to Bryant's motives for making such a statement range
from his accuser's insistence on it being given "as a price of freedom" as
claimed by the victim's defense attorney in 2020 to "guilt, some sort of
attempt at image rehabilitation, or a genuine sense of trying to achieve
some kind of atonement."' 05 Leaving aside Bryant's de facto admission
that his accuser did not believe she was consenting, of more importance
is to consider how any trial might have proceeded if Colorado Statute
Section 18-3-402 (2020), which deals with rape (sexual assault),
contained a fault element of recklessness whose definition included
06
giving no thought as to whether the prosecutrix was consenting.1
Colorado Statute Section 18-3-402, unlike Section 261 of the
California Penal Code, does contain a fault element, namely,
knowledge.1 07 Colorado Statute Section 18-3-402 commences as follows:
"(1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual
penetration on-a victim commits sexual assault if .... "1 0 8 This begs the
question: why not also include a broad definition of recklessness such as
in Section 47 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) discussed
in Part II?

104. Dave Zirin, Wrestling with Kobe Bryant's Forgotten Apology, THE NATION (Apr.
19, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/wrestling-in-with-kobe-bryants-forgotten-

apology/.
105. Id.
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2020).
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (2020); Cf COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-402 (2020).
108. COLO. REV. STAT., supra note

106.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss1/1

30

Hemming: Reforming the Law of Rape in the United States: Some Advice from

REFORMING

2020]

7THE LAW OF RAPE IN

/HE UN1TED STA TES

31
3

C. Affirmative Consent
The definition of reckless indifference in Section 47 of the Criminal
Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) includes taking reasonable steps to
ascertain whether the other person does in fact consent to the act before
deciding to proceed. 1" This is known as affirmative consent," 0 and a
minority of jurisdictions in the United States have defined consent such
as to require words or overt actions to indicate agreement.

"

A minority of jurisdictions, including the District of
Columbia, Minnesota, New Jersey, Washington, and
Wisconsin, require words or overt actions indicating
agreement for sexual intercourse or acts to be considered
consensual. These jurisdictions define "consent" by statute
or case law, generally, as words or overt actions indicating a
freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or
contact.
Washington's Revised Code Section 9A.44.010(7) defines consent in
these terms: "'Consent' means that at the time of the act of sexual
intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct indicating
freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. This
definition is open to different interpretations."" 2
A similar provision in New Jersey was considered by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in the case State in the Interest ofM T.S.1 3 The court
in M.T.S. stated:
Under the reformed statute, permission to engage in sexual
penetration must be affirmative and it must be given freely,
but that permission may be inferred either from acts or
statements reasonably viewed in light of the surrounding
circumstances. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (1984)
(defining consent as "freely given agreement"); see
also, People v. Patterson 410 N. W.2d at 749 (Boyle, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that "force" may include "a sexual
touching brought about involuntarily," and may consist of "a
contact which occurs before consent can be given or
(indicating that
refused"); cf
N.JS.A. 2C:2-10(c)(3)
109. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 47(b).
110. See Nicholas J. Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results
of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1321 (2005), for an article in
support of aflirmative consent.
111. Tracy et al., supra note 58, at 20 (citing in footnote 113 the following: D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-3001(4) (West 2009); MINN. STAT. § 609.341(4)(a) (2019); State in Interest of M.T.S., 129
N.J. 422, 443 (1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2020); and Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 940.225(4) (West 2018)).
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(7) (2020).
113. State in the Interest of M. TS., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

31

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

32

[Vol. 32

"consent" does not constitute a defense sufficient to negate
an element of a crime if consent was induced or
accomplished by force or coercion). Persons need not, of
course, expressly announce their consent to engage in
intercourse for there to be affirmative permission.
Permission to engage in an act of sexual penetration can be
and indeed often is indicated through physical actions rather
than words. Permission is demonstrated when the evidence,
in whatever form, is sufficient to demonstrate that a
reasonable person would have believed that the alleged
victim had affirmatively and freely given authorization to the
act. 14
The Supreme Court of New Jersey continued by explaining the role
of the fact finder and the matters the State must prove beyond reasonable
doubt in a case of sexual assault, asserting:
. .. The role of the factfinder is to decide not whether
engaging in an act of penetration without permission of
another person is reasonable, but only whether the
defendant's belief that the alleged victim had freely given
affirmative permission was reasonable.
In these cases neither the alleged victim's subjective state of
mind nor the reasonableness of the alleged victim's actions
can be deemed relevant to the offense. The alleged victim
may be questioned about what he or she did or said only to
determine whether the defendant was reasonable in
believing that affirmative permission had been freely given.
To repeat, the law places no burden on the alleged victim to
have expressed non-consent or to have denied permission,
and no inquiry is made into what he or she thought or desired
or why he or she did not resist or protest.
In short, in order to convict under the sexual assault statute
in cases such as these, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was sexual penetration and that
it was accomplished without the affirmative and freely-given
permission of the alleged victim. As we have indicated, such
proof can be based on evidence of conduct or words in light
of surrounding circumstances and must demonstrate beyond
a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would not have
believed that there was affirmative and freely-given
permission. If there is evidence to suggest that the defendant
reasonably believed that such permission had been given, the
State must demonstrate either that defendant did not actually
believe that affirmative permission had been freely-given or
114. Id. at 1277.
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that such a belief was unreasonable under all of the
circumstances. Thus, the State bears the burden of proof
throughout the case. 11 5
The final sentence in the above passage has not been universally
accepted, not least by the American Bar Association's House of
Delegates who on August 12, 2019, "voted 256 - 165 to postpone
consideration of a measure urging state legislatures to adopt an
'affirmative consent' standard - a concept often described on campuses
as 'yes means yes."' 1 6 The opposition's argument was "affirmative
consent would improperly shift the burden of proof from the state to the
defendant, violating the accused party's civil liberties . . . [t]he defeat
provided an important opportunity for the nation's highest-profile legal
organization to take a stand for fair treatment of the accused."117
With respect, neither the Supreme Court of New Jersey nor the
majority of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates are
correct regarding the onus of proof and affirmative consent. This is
because the introduction of the reasonable steps test replaces the mistake
of fact defense, and therefore does not leave the onus of proof unchanged,
contrary to the view stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State
of New Jersey in the Interest of MTS." While it is still for the
prosecution to disprove the defendant's mistaken belief, there is an onus
on the defendant to show he or she took reasonable steps to ascertain
whether or not the complainant was consenting to the act. This falls short
of placing the onus of proof on the defendant to prove the mistaken belief
was honest and reasonable, contrary to the position taken by the majority
of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates.119
In effect, mistake of fact has been replaced by the reasonable steps test
such that the belief in consent has to be more reasonable than honest, by
which it is meant the subjective test of "honest" is a secondary factor to
the objective test of "reasonable." In this context, the minimum standard
of "reasonable" requires the defendant to undertake at least some physical
or verbal steps to find out whether the other person is consenting. The
defendant can no longer assume consent in his or her own mind.
The revised Model Penal Code sexual assault provisions,1 20 which are
an affirmative consent formulation, have been summarized by Gruber as
follows:
115. Id. at 1279.
116. K.C. Johnson, "Affirmative Consent" as a Legal Standard?, CITY J. (N.Y.), (Aug. 14,
2019), https://www.city-journal.org/affirmative-consent [https://perma.cc/F2QW-7T72.

117. Id.
118. State in the Interest ofM. T.S., supra note 113, at 1279-80.
119. See Johnson, supra note 116.

120. MODEL PENAL CODE:
5, Sept. 8, 2015).

SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Preliminary Draft No.
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[S]ex must occur with consent, which the defendant may
determine from all the circumstances, including words,
conduct, and overall context . . . . [The] proposal
criminalizes sexual penetration without "consent," defined
as "a person's freely given agreement to engage in a specific
act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, communicated
by conduct, words, or both." Importantly, the provision
clarifies that "consent may be explicit or it may be inferred
from the totality of the circumstances." Thus, in order to find
guilt, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that,
given the entire picture of the situation, the defendant
12 1
believed the sex was not consensual.
As Little has pointed out, the purpose of an affirmative consent
standard is to grant women the right to determine whether they wish to
allow a "particular act of sex on that particular occasion with that
particular man." 12 2 It is difficult to understand how the revised Model
Penal Code's affirmative consent formulation is to be attained when (a)
the defendant's subjective belief as to consent under all the circumstances
is the relevant test; and (b) affirmative consent is not buttressed with a
fault element of reckless indifference, which includes (i) giving no
thought as to whether or not the other person was consenting and (ii) the
taking of reasonable physical or verbal steps to ascertain consent. The
better view is to make the relevant test of affirmative consent as objective
as possible, which includes dealing with the issue of intoxication.
D. Affirmative Consent and Intoxication
Clearly, there are two parties in a rape case, either one of whom or
both may be intoxicated at the relevant time. 12 3 For the alleged victim,
consent is vitiated where the circumstances are such that consent could
not have been given as the victim was prevented from resisting, as for
example in Sections 261(3) and (4) of the California Penal Code.
(3) Where a person is prevented from resisting by any
intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled
substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably
should have been known by the accused.
(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature
of the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this
121. Aya Gruber, Not Affirmative Consent, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 683, 684 (2016).
122. Little, supra note 110, at 1363 (citing AILEEN MCCOLGAN, THE CASE FOR TAKING
DATE OUT OF RAPE 49 (1996)).

THE

123. For the alleged victim, voluntary intoxication can affect consent either by rendering the
person incapable of resisting or to give temporal consent which is later regretted. The focus of
this Article is on the former. For a full discussion of the latter, see Kevin Cole, Sex and the Single
Malt Girl: How Voluntary Intoxication Affects Consent, 78 MONT. L. REV. 155 (2017).
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paragraph, "unconscious of the nature of the act" means
incapable of resisting because the victim meets any one of
the following conditions:
(A) Was unconscious or asleep.
(B) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that
the act occurred.1 24

In both Sections 261(3) and (4) above, the fault element is knowledge
in that the condition of the victim was known to the accused. However,
to what extent is the subjective component of knowledge (awareness)
affected by intoxication for the purpose of sheeting home criminal
responsibility to the accused?
It will be recalled from Part III.A above, knowledge is defined under
2.02(2)(b) of the Model Penal Code as:
2.02 General Requirements of Culpability.
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element
of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result. s
Intoxication is dealt with under Section 2.08 of the Model Penal Code.
Section 2.08. Intoxication.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (4) of this Section,
intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives
an element of the offense.
(2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense,
if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a
risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober,
such unawareness is immaterial.

124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (2019).
125.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02(2) (AM.

L. INST. 1985).
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(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease
within the meaning of Section 4.01.
(4) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is
pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such
intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality
[wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
Explanatory Note
Subsection (1) declares the basic proposition that
intoxication is not as such an excuse for criminal conduct.
For the actor's intoxication to have any defensive efficacy it
must negative an element of the offense (other than
awareness of the risk in recklessness) or, if the intoxication
was involuntary or pathological, establish irresponsibility.
Subsection (2) establishes the special rule with respect to
awareness of the risk in recklessness, qualifying the general
requirement of Section 2.02(2)(c). If the actor, due to selfinduced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would
have been aware had he been sober, his unawareness is
declared to be immaterial.1 2 6
There are two major conclusions to be drawn from Section 2.08 of the
Model Penal Code and the Explanatory Note. First, under Section
2.08(1), the intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives
an element of the offense.1 27 Secondly, only if the fault. element is
recklessness, is the actor's unawareness declared to be immaterial.1 2 8
Thus, for example, because knowledge, and not recklessness, is the fault
element under Sections 261(3) and (4) of the California Penal Code
above, then intoxication does have defensive efficacy to the accused
provided he or she was sufficiently intoxicated to be able to negate the
knowledge element of the offense of rape where the relevant
circumstances come under Sections 261(3) and (4) of the California Penal
Code.
However, the situation is different if no fault element is proscribed in
the relevant Code or criminal statute legislation, as the default fault
element of the Model Penal Code is recklessness. Consequently, if the
relevant rape statute does not specify a fault element, then applying

126. MODEL PENAL CODE
1984).

§ 2.08(1)-(4) and explanatory note on §§ (1) and (2) (AM. L. INST.

127. Id. §§ 1.
128. Id. §§ 2.
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Section 2.02(3) of the Model Penal Code 12 9 a court would read in the fault
element of recklessness. For example, under Section 794.011 of the 2019
Florida Statues, which deals with the crime of sexual battery, there are
seven circumstances under which consent is deemed to not be given by
the victim. 0 O Note in consent circumstance number four, given below,
which covers the situation where a victim is intoxicated, that no fault
element is prescribed:
4. The offender, without the prior knowledge or consent of
the victim, administers or has knowledge of someone else
administering to the victim any narcotic, anesthetic, or other
intoxicating substance that mentally or physically
incapacitates the victim. 13 1
The court would read into the statute the fault element of recklessness
as the default fault element. This then enlivens Section 2.08(2) of the
Model Penal Code, resulting in the accused's unawareness being
immaterial, and in this regard the accused's criminal responsibility is
treated as one of strict liability. Effectively, the interaction between the
default mental state of recklessness and voluntary intoxication
imputes liability by denying the admission of evidence of intoxication
despite the weight it might otherwise have to support an accused's claim
to have been subjectively unaware of the risk associated with the
accused's conduct. 3 2
Unsurprisingly, this state of affairs has caused considerable unrest in
criminal law circles over a long period of time. The sponsor of the Model
Penal Code, the American Law Institute (ALI), has been working on
reforming Article 213 (Sexual Assault and Related Offenses). Erin Price,
writing in 2017, has usefully summarized the Model Penal Code's
proposed changes as follows:
The ALI is currently amending the MPC's provisions on
Sexual Assault and Related Offenses. In the current
proposal, Section 213.0(4) states, "the provisions of Model
Penal Code Section 2.08(2) shall not apply to this Article."
The "Article" mentioned is Article 213, which is the Sexual
129. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST. 1985) ("Culpability Required Unless
Otherwise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense
is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or
recklessly with respect thereto."). As recklessly is the lowest of the three prescribed fault elements
on the criminal responsibility ladder, the court would read in the fault element of recklessly.
130. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(e) (2019).
131. Id.

§ (4)(e)(4).

132. Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditionsof One 's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits
of Theory in CriminalLaw Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. 1, 36 (1985) ("The Model Penal Code would
impute recklessness to the drinker who at the time of his imbibing is unaware of any risk that he
may kill or even beat his wife and thus would convict him of reckless homicide.").
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Assault and Related Offenses provision. The proposed draft,
in effect, rejects the premise that an offender is automatically
reckless because he became voluntarily intoxicated. Instead,
it would require that liability for the offenses in Sections
213.1 through 213.8 be proven by evidence of the offender's
actual subjective awareness for each material element. If the
offender lacks the subjective awareness required for the
material element, i.e. due to voluntary intoxication, he
cannot be held liable ....

.

While the proposed draft eliminates Section 2.08's
application to the Sexual Assault and Related Offenses
provisions, it keeps the protection for victims who are
"incapable of expressing unwillingness due to intoxication"
intact. The draft justifies retaining this safeguard because
voluntary intoxication should not be equated with a victim
waiving his or her right to "autonomous choice and bodily
integrity."..
Overall, the draft presents an innovative approach to rape
prosecutions by recognizing that a standard that penalizes
any sexual activity with an intoxicated individual is
inappropriate. If adopted, the proposal permits admitting
evidence of both the victim's and the accused's mental
state. 13 3
A more recent commentary on the ALI's Tentative Draft No. 3,134
which signals an ongoing, see-saw battle in the ALI between proponents
of the subjective and objective approach to affirmative consent, has been
put forward by Cole.' 35
In spring 2016, the ALI fought a floor battle over the core
difficulty of affirmative-consent provisions - their reliance
on objective definitions of "consent."1 36 Rejecting the
recommendation of its reporters, the Institute adopted a
subjective definition of "consent," focusing on whether the
partner was "willing" to engage in the sexual activity in
question. 137 Without any change in proposed statutory
language, the reporters' draft presented during the spring
133. Erin Price, The Model Penal Code's New Approach to Rape and Intoxication, 48 U.

PAC. L. REV. 423, 431-33 (2017).
134.

MODEL PENAL CODE:

SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. L. INST.,

Tentative Draft No. 3, Apr. 6, 2017).
135. Kevin Cole, Affirmative'Consent by Way of the Intoxication "Defense," 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 47, 47 (2017).
136. Braford Richardson, American Law Institute Considering 'Affirmative Consent'
Position on Sexual Assault, WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2016/May/17/influential-legal-group-considering-affirmative-co/.

137. Id.
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2017 annual meeting signals an approach that would
undermine the Institute's preference for a subjective
definition of consent. The mechanism is a reversal of the
reporters' previous position on the intoxication defense. 138
That reversal would return to the reporters' preferred
objective approach to "consent" in the large percentage of
cases in which the accused is intoxicated.1
Cole continues with a history of the ALI reform project. 140
Since the beginning of the ALI project, its reporters have
rejected Section 2.08(2).141 In Preliminary Draft No. 3,
Section 213.0(8) states: "'Recklessly' shall carry only the
meaning designated in Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c). The
provisions of Model
Penal Code § 2.08(2) shall not apply to
42
this Article."1
Cole then reflects on the most recent draft which represents a complete
turnaround from rejecting Section 2.08(2) to embracing it. 14 3
By embracing Section 2.08(2), the latest draft requires the
same kind of objective inquiry into "consent" that the
Institute rejected in spring 2016 in the cases in which the
actor is under the influence.1 4 4 In those cases, a factfmder
must ascertain whether an actor, unaware of a substantial
risk of a partner's unwillingness, "would have been aware
had he been sober."14
Cole concludes by contending that a rejection of Section 2.08(2) is not
really a repudiation of the Model Penal Code's original approach.
... The ALI enacted section 2.08(2) in 1962 in connection
with a Model Penal Code that required greater culpability
than recklessness for a sexual assault conviction. In the
138.

See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (AM. L.

INST.,

Tentative Draft No. 3, Apr. 6, 2017).

139. See id.
140. Cole, supranote 135, at 48-49.
141. See Kevin Cole, Better Sex Through Criminal Law: Proxy Crimes, Covert Negligence,

and Other Difficulties of "Affirmative Consent" in the AL's Draft Sexual Assault Provisions, 53
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 538 (2016).
142. MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.0(8) (AM. L.
INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, Oct. 30, 2013).
143. Cole, supra note 135, at 51.
144. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.0(4) (AM.
L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, Apr. 6, 2017).
145. "Unwillingness" is a useful but somewhat misleading shorthand. Consent is defined in

terms of "willingness." A person who has given no thought to a sex act is not "willing" to engage
in that act; "unwillingness" as used here is not intended to imply that the partner must have thought
about and rejected the sex act for consent to be lacking.
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absence of threats or force, the MPC imposed criminal
liability for violations of sexual autonomy only when the
actor "knows that the contact is offensive to the other
person." Since the provision required the actor's knowledge,
Section 2.08(2) would not have applied. Making liability
turn on recklessness is sensible, but to do so in addition to
applying section 2.08(2) is effectively to expand the scope

of the intoxication provision. 146
Section 2.08(2) would not have applied. Making liability
The ongoing battle between the subjective and objective approaches
to the interaction of affirmative consent and intoxication is misplaced.
The author respectfully agrees with Cole that liability should turn on
recklessness (but not recklessness as defined under Section 2.02(2)(c) of
the Model Penal Code),1 47 and that the additional application of strict
liability under Model Penal Code Section 2.08(2) dealing with
Intoxication, would be an unwarranted expansion of criminal
responsibility.
However, there is a better view which fmds expression in Section
36B(l)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), previously discussed in Part
II.C. 14 8 An objective test is applied in determining whether a person who
is intoxicated has a reasonable belief in consent, such that regard must be
had to the standard of a reasonable person who is not intoxicated and who
is otherwise in the same circumstances as that person at the relevant time.
This would prevent a general "because-I-was-drunk" defense while
allowing the accused to adduce evidence of his or her own intoxication.
III. MODEL PROVISION FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE IN THE UNITED STATES

There are two underlying foundations to the proposed model
provision for the crime of rape in the United States. The first is that the
majority of States have adopted some version of the Model Penal Code. 14 9
The second is that all States have a list of circumstances that vitiate
consent. As regards the adoption of the Model Penal Code, it is but a short
step to amend the definition of recklessness in Section 2.02(2)(c) in the
Model Penal Code for the purpose of including the new definition of
reckless indifference in the relevant Part of the Code dealing with sexual
assault provisions. As discussed in Part II.D above, the definition of
reckless indifference includes taking reasonable steps to ascertain
146. Cole, supra note 135, at 53.
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
148. See supra note 40.
149. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM L. REV. 319, 320 (2007) ("Promulgated in 1962, the code prompted a

wave of state code reforms in the 196os and 1970s, each influenced by the Model Penal Code.").
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consent. This has the advantage of avoiding a debate as to a definition of
affirmative consent which appears to have paralyzed the American Law
Institute. Instead, "consent" would simply be defined as "free and
voluntary agreement."
The inclusion of the provision dealing with taking reasonable steps to
ascertain consent also sweeps away the subjective component of the
defense .of mistake of fact. As mentioned previously, while it is still for
the prosecution to disprove the defendant's mistaken belief, there is an
onus on the defendant to show he or she took reasonable steps to ascertain
whether or not the complainant was consenting to the act. This onus
measured against an objective standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances does not reverse the onus of proof, but it does not leave the
onus of proof unchanged because the subjective component of the
defense of mistake of fact has been removed.
Such objectivity is reinforced by measuring the intoxicated accused's
reasonable belief in consent against the standard of a reasonable person
who is not intoxicated and who is otherwise in the same circumstances as
that person at the relevant time.
The purpose of the proposed model provision is on the one hand to
avoid a rapist's charter, 50 while on the other hand to prevent the accused
from facing a rebuttable presumption of guilt. Essentially, the proposed
model rape provision below specifies two alternative fault elements of
knowingly, which is taken from Section 2.02(2)(b) in the Model Penal
Code,"' and recklessly indifferent which perforce changes the definition
of recklessly given in Section 2.02(2)(c) in the Model Penal Code.1 52 The
inclusion of taking reasonable steps to ascertain consent also removes the
subjective component of Section 2.04(1) Mistake of fact in the Model
Penal Code. 5 3 The author's proposed model rape provision is as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of rape if the person has sexual
intercourse with another person:
(a) without the other person's consent;154 and
(b) knowing about the lack of consent, or being
recklessly indifferent as to the lack of consent, or having no
150. Professor Jennifer Temkin famously referred to the House of Lords decision in Director
ofPublic Prosecutionsv. Morgan [1975] UKHL 3, [1976] AC 182 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.)
as a "rapist's charter." The House of Lords held that an honest but mistaken belief that the victim
was consenting would provide a complete defense; the basis for that belief did not need to be
objectively reasonable so long as the jury were satisfied that the defendant honestly believed it.

Id.
151. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1984).
152. Id. at §2.02(2)(c).
153. Id. at § 2.04(1).
154. "Consent" is defined as free and voluntary agreement.
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reasonable grounds. for believing the other person was
consenting.
For the purpose of this sub-section, the following definitions
apply:
Knowingly:1 55 a person acts knowingly with respect to a
material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result.

-

Recklessly indifferent: a person is recklessly indifferent to
the fact that another person does not consent to an act, or has
withdrawn consent to an act, if he or she
(a) is aware of the possibility that the other person
might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent
to the act, but decides to proceed regardless of that
possibility; or
(b) is aware of the possibility that the other person
might not be consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent
to the act, but fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain
whether the other person does in fact consent, or has in fact
withdrawn consent, to the act before deciding to proceed; or
(c) does not give any thought as to whether or not
the other person is consenting to the act, or has withdrawn
consent to the act before deciding to proceed.
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1)(b), reasonable belief
in consent depends on the circumstances known to a person
at the time and includes any reasonable physical or verbal
steps a person has taken to ascertain whether the other person
is consenting.
(3) In determining whether a person who is intoxicated is
aware of the possibility that the other person might not be
consenting to the act, or has withdrawn consent to the act, or
has a reasonable belief at any time, if the intoxication is selfinduced, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable
person who is not intoxicated and who is otherwise in the
same circumstances as that person at the relevant time.
155. MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02(2)(b) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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By contrast with the above proposed model provision for the crime of
rape-with its emphasis on the fault element of"recklessly indifferent"no jurisdiction in the United States specifically prescribes recklessness
under Section 2.02(2)(c) in the Model Penal Code as a fault element for
rape. Instead, recklessness operates as the default fault element under
Section 2.02(3) of the Model Penal Code, provided no other fault element
(such as knowledge) is prescribed. 5 6 A definition of recklessness can be
found in Section 794.011(4)(b) of the 2019 Florida Statues as:
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor's situation.157

This begs the question: why do legislators in the United States not
specifically avail themselves of recklessness, rather than knowledge, as
the fault element for rape, as opposed to relying on recklessness obliquely
as the default fault element, when recklessness is both lower on the fault
ladder of criminal responsibility and contains an objective component of
"a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation?" This is the more surprising as the
inclusion of the fault element of knowledge is confined to a small
minority of States such as Colorado Statute 18-3-402 (2016).158
Instead, the legislative pattern or formula for rape in the United States
appears to be as follows:
1. The statement that rape is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a person under any of the following
circumstances which do not constitute free and voluntary
agreement, eschewing reference to a fault element and
instead relying on the default fault element of recklessness.
2. The setting out of a list of vitiating circumstances from
force and being unconscious to artifice and retaliation. Some
of these vitiating circumstances may specify the fault
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST. 1984).
157. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)(b) (2019).
158. Tracy et al., supra note 58, at 20 (citing D.C. CODE § 22-3001(4) (2012); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5503 (2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.020 (West 201I); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503

(2011)).
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element of knowledge, such as the unconscious state of the
person being known to the accused.
3. The availability of the defense of mistake of fact provided
there is evidence of the victim's equivocal conduct.
4. The interaction between the default fault element of
recklessness and voluntary intoxication imputes liability by
denying the admission of evidence of intoxication.
This Article contends that the above legislative pattern or formula for
rape in the United States is clumsy, circuitous, piecemeal and lacks
clarity.
Turning now to the second foundation of the proposed model
provision for the crime of rape in the United States, namely, the list of
circumstances that vitiate consent, it is further contended that Section
36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) discussed in Part II.B,1 59 contains a
comprehensive list that could usefully be built upon in the United States.
Such a list is separate to the actual criminal provision specifying the
physical and fault elements of the offense of rape. The essence of the list
of circumstances that vitiate consent is comprehensiveness, such that
clarity is the hallmark by avoiding general phrases like fraud and deceit.
For example, Section 36(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) discussed in
Part II.B could be supplemented with additional Sub-Sections to clarify
the circumstances that vitiate consent. 160 These additions have the
advantage of being scrutinized and endorsed by the legislature rather than
emerging in case law. The author proposes the following list of
circumstances that vitiate consent:

-

Circumstances in which a person does not consent to an act
include, but are not limited to,161 the following
(i) the person submits to the act because of intimidating or
coercive conduct, or other threat, that does not involve a
threat of force;
(ii) the person submits to the act because of the abuse of a
position of authority or trust;16 2
(iii) the person gave conditional consent to the act provided
the other person wore a condom or withdrew his penis before

159. See supra Part IL.B.

160. See supra Part I.B.
161. The list of vitiating factors is non-exhaustive to allow some degree ofjudicial discretion
where a circumstance not previously considered by the legislature arises in the future. However,
it would then be for the legislature to amend the list accordingly provided it supports the case law.

162. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61 HE(8)(c) (Austl.).
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ejaculating and the condition was not met;
(iv) the person agrees or submits to the act because of the
fraud or misrepresentation of the accused.
Note
Frauds or misrepresentations, as a
vitiating circumstance to consent,
are confined to a full comprehension
of the nature and purpose of the act
and the identity of the person, and
specifically exclude a deception
involving infidelity, wealth, marital
status, intention to marry, and
intention to pay a sex worker.' 63
The purpose of the Note above is to prescribe the reach of frauds or
misrepresentations and to avoid the potential for criminal responsibility
extending beyond community standards which an elected legislature
represents.
The United States, like Australia, has a myriad of different
circumstances that vitiate consent, many expressed in general terms
which leave open the exact reach of criminal responsibility. Criminal
Codes are designed to be complete expressions of the criminal law,
allowing the citizen to readily comprehend his or her criminal
responsibility. This desirable situation cannot occur if the language of the
legislation
is
expressed
in
open-ended,
general
terms.
Comprehensiveness and clarity are the bedrock of a properly functioning
Criminal Code.
CONCLUSION

This Article has contended that the law of rape in the United States
needs reform, and that the more progressive jurisdictions in Australia,
such as Victoria and South Australia, provide positive examples which
the various jurisdictions in the United States could usefully adopt and
incorporate.

There is a certain irony in the fact that under the auspices of the
American Law Institute, the Model Penal Code 1962 was a pioneering
work that provided the basis for the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). As
discussed in Part II.A, Section 192 of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT),
which deals with sexual intercourse without consent, is written in terms

163. See D.P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV., 317, 470-75, 480-87 (2000)
(lying about having a venereal disease and failing to disclose a venereal disease were both
considered by respondents to be sufficient to vitiate consent).
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that reflect the architecture of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth).4 For
present purposes, dealing with the specification of fault elements, the
relevant Sub-Sections are 192(3) and 192(4A):
(3) A person is guilty of an offense if the person has sexual
intercourse with another person:
(a) without the other person's consent; and
(b) knowing about or being reckless as to the lack of
consent.
(4A) For subsection (3) being reckless as to a lack of
consent to sexual intercourse includes not giving any thought
to whether or not the other person is consenting to the sexual
intercourse. 165
The point being that every jurisdiction in the United States could
commence its rape provisions in a similar vein, given that "knowingly"
and "recklessly" are defined in the Model Penal Code in Sections
2.02(2)(b) and (c), respectively.1 66 The argument has been put that
"recklessly" under Section 2.02(2)(c) should be replaced with a wide
definition of "recklessly indifferent" for the purpose of rape provisions,
but that at a minimum fault elements should be prescribed. Instead, it is
common in the United States for the relevant rape provision to be silent
on the fault elements, leaving recklessness to operate as the default fault
element where Section 2.02(3) (Culpability Required Unless Otherwise
Provided) applies.1 67
As has been seen, the operation of recklessness as the default fault
element has unfortunate consequences, which have not been addressed,
by enlivening Section 2.08(2) of the Model Penal Code, resulting in the
intoxicated accused's unawareness being immaterial, and in this regard
the accused's criminal responsibility is treated as one of strict liability.
Effectively, rape is being treated as a crime of basic intent and the
evidence of intoxication is inadmissible.1 68
Then, there is Section 2.04(1) (Mistake of Fact) of the Model Penal
Code.' 69 Legislatures in the United States have abdicated their
responsibility to clarify the interaction between the defense of mistake of
fact and consent being defined as free and voluntary agreement to the
164. See supra Part II.A.

165. CriminalCode Act 1983 (NT) s 192(3), (4A) (Austl.).
166. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b)-(c) (AM. L. INST. 1984).
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST. 1984).
168. Basic intent offenses are offenses which require an intention to merely perform an act,

such as assault. Specific intent offenses are offenses which require an intention to bring about a
particular consequence, such as grievous bodily harm or murder.
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (AM. L. INST. 1984).
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courts. Case law has imported the test of allowing the defense only where
the evidence of consent is "equivocal."1 7 0 Importantly, the so called
"consent defense" under Section 2.04(1)(b) provides for a subjective test
in the form of "the state of mind established by such . . . mistake" to
constitute a defense. 17 1
In sum, the law of rape in the United States is unsatisfactory because:
(1) fault elements are rarely prescribed; (2) the default fault element of
recklessness operates in an adhoc manner with negative implications for
the intoxicated accused; (3) the operation of the defense of mistake of fact
has been delegated by legislatures to the courts; and (4) the list of
circumstances that vitiate consent varies widely.
The proposed solution is to "customize" rape provisions by specifying
how the general part of the Code dealing with criminal responsibility is
to be modified to suit the challenges of the specific part of the Code
dealing with sexual assault offenses. Thus, instead of using the definition
of "recklessly" under Section 2.02(2)(c) of the Model Penal Code,1 7 2 a
broader defmition of "recklessly indifferent" is imported for the relevant
Division or Part of the Code covering sexual assault defenses. The
specification of a broadly defined fault element avoids the vagaries of
deploying the default fault element of recklessness, as well as dealing
with the subjective component of mistake of fact under Section 2.04(1)(b)
of the Model Penal Code 7 3 through the mechanism of the reasonable
steps test to ascertain consent.

While the reasonable steps provision may not add a great deal to the
question of the accused's mens rea, it does provide a standard against
which to measure the honesty of the accused's asserted belief in consent,
as the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have acknowledged in R. v.
Barton.174

The overall purpose of the proposed comprehensive model provision
for the crime of rape is to make the process of adjudging criminal
responsibility more objective against community standards of when
consent has been vitiated.

170. See People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 964-66 (Cal. 1992).
171. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 169, at § 2.04(1)(b).
172. Id. at § 2.02(2)(c).
173. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 169, at §204(1)(b).
174. See R. v. Barton 2019 SCC 33, [2019] 435 D.L.R. 191, para. 113 (Can.) ("[A]s a
practical matter it is hard to conceive of a situation in which reasonable steps would not also
constitute reasonable grounds for the purpose of assessing the honesty of the accused's asserted

belief."). The Supreme Court of Canada was considering § 273.2(b) of the Canada Criminal Code
which states: "[T]he accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the
accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting." Canada Criminal Code,

R.S.C. 1985, c C-46.
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